Paul O'Grady clearly distinguishes five main kinds: relativism about truth, relativism about logic, ontological relativism, epistemological relativism, and, finally, relativism about rationality. In each case he shows what makes a position relativist and how it differs from a sceptical or pluralist position. He ends by presenting a thoroughly integrated position that rejects some forms while defending others. The book includes discussion of recent work by Putnam, Devitt, Searle, Priest, and Quine and offers a succinct survey of contemporary debates. This lively discussion of the issue will be welcome reading for all those involved in philosophical inquiry.

Relativism - A Guide for the Perplexed

Relativism is a philosophical topic that has many dimensions and can mean many things. It is the view that one thing owes existence, truth, goodness or beauty to something else and is central to an understanding of any of the four traditional divisions of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. Relativism: A Guide for the Perplexed offers a concise introduction to relativism and how it applies to the different parts of the basic, foundational areas of philosophy and, indeed, to every area of human enquiry.

Linguistic relativism: Logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural comparison
Christian Greiffenhagen and Wes Sharrock
Linguistic relativism is the thesis that the grammatical structures of different languages imply different conceptions of reality. In this paper we critically discuss one form of linguistic relativism, which argues that grammatical differences between the English and Yoruba language exhibit differences in how English and Yoruba speakers ‘see’ reality (namely in terms of ‘spatiotemporal particulars’ and ‘sortal particulars’, respectively).
We challenge the idea that linguistic relativism is an empirical thesis, i.e., a thesis that is substantiated through anthropological examples. We show that linguistic relativism is based on two assumptions: firstly, that the purpose of language is to describe the world; secondly, that being able to speak presupposes an ontological theory of the ultimate constituents of the world. We argue that the attempt to extract the outline of that theory from the language inevitably distorts the portrayal of language-using practice itself.