This volume is a collection of papers that explore the nature of the interfaces of syntax with semantics, phonology, and discourse. The papers investigate the various ways in which elliptical structures are related to these interfaces. As such, they not only make a valuable contribution to generative linguistic research but, more generally, help to deepen our understanding of the relation between form and meaning in natural language.

According to the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Classical truth-conditional semantics is coming under increasing attack, however, from contextualists and inferentialists, who agree that meaning is located in the mind.
How to Think about Meaning develops an even more radical mentalist semantics, which it does by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Whereas for classical semantics the object of analysis is an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green," for attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green." Explicit relativization to some speaker S allows for semantic theory then to make contact with psychology, sociology, historical linguistics, and other empirical disciplines.
The attitudinal approach is motivated both by theoretical considerations and by its practical success in dealing with recalcitrant phenomena in the theory of meaning. These include: presuppositions as found in hate speech, and more generally the connotative force of evaluative language; the problem of how to represent ambiguity; quotation and the use-mention distinction; and the liar paradox, which appears to contradict truth-based semantics.

As one of the world's leading and most highly-acclaimed contemporary theorists, Christopher Norris has spent much of the last twenty years trying to promote better relations and mutual understanding between the divisive analytic and continental philosophical traditions. In his new book, "On Truth and Meaning", Norris examines key issues in the philosophy of logic, mind and language those that have defined the agenda of current debate in analytic philosophy. Among the book's central themes are a number of much-rehearsed, but as yet unresolved questions that have preoccupied many leading analytic philosophers.

How is the meaning of natural language interpreted? Taking as its point of departure the logical problem of natural language acquisition, this book elaborates a theory of meaning based on syntactical rather than semantical processes. Hornstein argues that the traditional neoFregean approach taken by Davidson, Barwise and Perry, and Montague, among others - an approach that makes use of semantical notions like "truth" and "reference" - should be replaced by a theory drawn from the syntactical vocabulary of generative grammar.
Surprisingly, the book points out that linguistic competence can be acquired despite the degeneracy, finiteness, and deficiency of the environmental stimulus, and it characterizes those innate aspects of the mind which enable a child to develop into a native speaker.

Current textbooks in formal semantics are all versions of, or introductions to, the same paradigm in semantic theory: Montague Grammar. Knowledge of Meaning is based on different assumptions and a different history. It provides the only introduction to truth - theoretic semantics for natural languages, fully integrating semantic theory into the modern Chomskyan program in linguistic theory and connecting linguistic semantics to research elsewhere in cognitive psychology and philosophy. As such, it better fits into a modern graduate or undergraduate program in linguistics, cognitive science, or philosophy. Furthermore, since the technical tools it employs are much simpler to teach and to master, Knowledge of Meaning can be taught by someone who is not primarily a semanticist.