Suzanne Bachelard’s main preoccupation has been with the clarification of the phenomenological dimensions of all branches of knowledge. A dominant theme in her work is the claim that epistemology has two orientations: the subjective and the objective. Her translation of and commentary on Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (1968) are exemplars of scholarship in which she examines Husserl’s theory of science and clarifies the nature of his anti-psychologism. She emphasizes that although anti-psychologism is an important strand in Husserl’s thought, his phenomenology should never be reduced simply to that strand. Rather, her aim is ‘to exclude beforehand the hypothesis of a psychologistic interpretation, the danger of which seems to us to be ever renascent’ (1968, Preface, p. xxxi). She maintains that when Husserl returned, in 1929, to the study of logic, his earlier work enabled him not only to find a radical grounding for logic but also, and by means of this radical grounding, to present new aspects of the phenomenological method in an impressively systematic manner.
Bachelard holds that the human cogito is never exhausted by descriptions of its cogita; that any actual intention has a scope or horizon of potentialities. The transcendental analysis of consciousness, she writes, ‘can be a concrete investigation of this entire totality of actualities and potentialities without losing, as a result, its specifically transcendental character’ (ibid.).